The broad topic of 'crime and cyberliberties ' 
Introduction
I am delighted and honoured to address this important conference. I want to thank the members of the Cyberlaw Research Unit at the University of Leeds not only for organizing this conference and inviting me to participate in it, but also for their pathbreaking work on cyberlaw and cyberliberties. They have been wonderful colleagues of mine and of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in both scholarly and advocacy endeavours.
I am proud that the ACLU, which is America's largest and oldest civil liberties organization, has been at the forefront of the newest civil liberties frontier, in cyberspacenot only throughout the US, but also, in collaboration with other organizations around the world, on a global basis. We are spearheading an international coalition called the Global Internet Liberty Campaign, or 'GILC'. 3 And a couple of our most active, effective coalition partners are in Britain and Ireland, including Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK), 4 which was founded by Yaman Akdeniz of the Leeds Cyberlaw Unit. In this international conference, it is important to stress the international scope of our cyberliberties work. Of course, cyberspace is an inherently global medium. And cybercrime and terrorism are worldwide concerns. Likewise, though, preserving human rights in cyberspace is also an international concern.
I have been asked to discuss the legal developments in the US, where we have had more legislation and litigation in this area than any other country. Our courts' rulings have been grounded specifically on US law-in particular, the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment to our Constitution and our constitutional right of privacy. However, those same freedoms are also guaranteed under international human rights law, under regional human rights instruments, including the European Convention on Human Rights, and under the domestic law of nations around the world.s Therefore, the principles that have guided legal developments in the US should be relevant in the British Isles and elsewhere, just as developments in Britain and in other parts of the world are also relevant in the US.
Overview of the Interrelationship between Cybercrime and Cyberliberties
The conference organizers asked me to outline the interrelationships between cybercrime and cyberliberties. This broad subject encompasses two major subtopics: first, the extent to which the exercise of certain liberties-notably, free expression-may be criminalized online even if it would be lawful in the traditional print media; and second, the extent to which online liberties-notably, privacy-may be restricted to facilitate punishment of established crimes, such as trafficking in child pornography or engaging in information terrorism. In other words, the first subtopic concerns whether government may restrict our cyberliberties in order to create new crimes, peculiar to cyberspace, and the second concerns whether government may restrict our cyberliberties in order to prosecute existing crimes, common to all media, more effectively.
In both contexts, many officials argue that we have to make trade-offs between, on the one hand, individual rights and, on the other hand, public safety. In fact, though, this alleged tension is oversimplified and misleading. In terms of advancing public safety, measures that stifle cyberliberties are often at best ineffective, and at worst counterproductive. This doubly-flawed nature of laws limiting cyberliberties shows the sadly prophetic nature of a statement that Thomas Jefferson made to James Madison more than 200 years ago, when these two American founders were corresponding about the Bill of Rights to the US Constitution. Jefferson warned that 'A society that will trade a little liberty for a little order will deserve neither and will lose both'.' This statement is right on the mark concerning the current debates about cybercrimes and cyberliberties, for several reasons. First, claims about the alleged unique dangers of online expression are exaggerated. Second, the types of criminal laws and enforcement strategies that have worked effectively in other media are also effective in cyberspace.
Third, far from harming minors, much of the online expression that has been targeted for censorship is affirmatively beneficial for them.
For these reasons, even those who specialize in protecting young people from sexual exploitation and violence-indeed, especially those experts-oppose Internet censorship. This is true, for example, of Ernie Allen, the Director of the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children in the US, which works closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local police agencies around our country. Mr Allen and his colleagues understand that the political obsession with suppressing ideas and images that are allegedly harmful to children's minds is a dangerous distraction and diversion from constructive efforts to protect actual children from tangible harm.' In short, cybercensorship does no more good for the safety and welfare of young people than it does for the free speech rights of everyone-and I say 'everyone' advisedly, since young people have free speech rights of their own.
The same false tension between liberty and security also marks too much of the political rhetoric about protecting online privacy through such measures as strong encryption or cryptography and anonymous communications. To be sure, law enforcement would to some extent be aided if officials could easily gain access to online communications, just as law enforcement would receive some benefits if officials could readily spy on all communications of any type. But such pervasive surveillance would violate internationally respected, fundamental privacy rights.' The consensus of the international community is that this would be too high a price to pay for reducing crime. After all, what would be the point of limiting our fellow citizens' interference with our personal security, only at the price of increasing police officers' interference with the very same security?o This point was eloquently stated by a great former Justice of the US Supreme Court, Louis Brandeis, who was one of the architects of the legal right to privacy even before he ascended to the high Court.
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen ... . Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher ... . Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker it breeds contempt for law ... . To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-... that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.
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Just as weakened privacy protections would let government officials access online communications by ordinary, law-abiding citizens, these same weakened protections would also enhance access to online communications by cybercriminals and terrorists. They will not comply with government restrictions on encryption. To the contrary, they will take all available measures to secure their own communications, including illegal measures. Meanwhile, thanks to legal limits on encryption, cybercriminals will more easily prey on law-abiding individuals and businesses, and vital infrastructures will be more vulnerable to cyberterrorists. For these reasons, even some government officials have joined with cyber-N Strossen libertarians in opposing limits on encryption. They concur that, on balance, such limits do more harm than good to public safety. 20 In the US, the battle over online privacy and encryption is being waged mostly in the legislative and executive branches of government, rather than in the courts, with the Clinton Administration steadily opposing strong encryption, but with many members of Congress, from both major political parties, on the other side. Thus far, at least, the US government is quite isolated in the international community in this respect, since most other countries allow strong encryption.
2 1 That is certainly true in Europe, which in general has stronger legal protections for privacy of communications and data than we have in the US. 22 However, the Clinton Administration is working hard to export its anti-privacy, anti-encryption stance around the world, 2 3 and it has gained support from some officials here in Britain, for example. Therefore, it is essential to understand why this stance is as inimical to public safety as it is to personal privacy.
Criminalizing Sexually-Oriented Online Expression
Now that I have sketched out the general picture concerning the relationship between cyberliberties and cybercrime, I would like to spend the rest of my time filling in some of the details. Let me start with the area where we have had the most legislation and litigation in the US, since this is also an area of great concern in other countries, including right here in Britain: namely, criminalizing online expression that is sexually oriented. In fact, Yaman
Akdeniz and I are co-authoring a book chapter on this topic, focusing on this aspect of cyberlaw in both the UK and the US. 24 In the US, from the moment that cyberspace first hit the public radar screen, we immediately saw political and media hysteria about 'cyberporn' and efforts to censor online expression of a sexual nature. This reaction was not surprising. Despite Americans' general commitment to free speech, throughout our history, any sexually-oriented expression in any medium has always been suspect. Since COPA regulates expression that is protected 'at least as to adults', 46 Judge Reed ruled, it is presumptively unconstitutional unless the government can satisfy the demanding 'strict scrutiny' test. It has to show both that the law's purpose is to promote an interest of 'compelling' importance and that the law is narrowly tailored to promote that purposein other words, that there are no 'less restrictive alternative' measures, which would be less burdensome on free speech. 4 Judge Reed concluded that the government does have a compelling interest in shielding minors even from materials that are not obscene by adult standards. 48 However, Judge Reed also concluded that the government was unlikely to be able to show that COPA is the least restrictive means of achieving this goal. 49 For example, Judge Reed noted that the evidence before him 'reveals that blocking or filtering technology may be at least as successful as COPA would be in restricting minors' access to harmful material online without imposing the burden on constitutionally protected speech that COPA imposes on adult users or Web site operators'.so The government has appealed from Judge Reed's ruling.s1 Quite likely, this case will go all the way to the US Supreme Court, which has only issued one decision on the 'harmful to minors' doctrine, which was more than 30 years ago. 2 Now let me turn to our second recent victory, in another important cyberspeech case, which is also still working its way through the court system. This case is called Mainstream Loudoun v. Loudoun County Library,53 and it is so far the only court ruling on the burgeoning controversy over filtering and blocking software. Ever since it became clear that the CDA and other direct censorial measures were facing constitutional difficulties, advocates of suppressing online sexual expression stepped up their promotion of rating and filtering systems, which would also bar access to the same expression. The ACLU has issued two reports explaining why all these systems are problematic for many reasons.54
For one thing, the filtering software is inevitably both under-inclusive and over-inclusive, in terms of blocking all the material it purports to, and only that material. Therefore, while individual Internet users certainly have the right to install software on their own computers that blocks out material they consider contrary to their values, there is still a problem. Almost all manufacturers of blocking software refuse to disclose either the sites they block or the criteria they use to determine which sites they will block. Consequently, the manufacturers are imposing their value choices on their customers. They are not facilitating the customers' exercise of their own freedom of choice. In short, this is really more of a consumer protection problem than a free speech problem. However, there is a serious free speech problem when the filtering software is installed not as a matter of choice on the part of individual users, but rather, by government officials who control the computers-in public institutions. Across the US, officials are busily installing or advocating blocking software on computers in public libraries, schools, and universities." Therefore, individual choice is stripped from the many members of the public whose only access to the Internet is through such computers. For them, the installation of filtering software on, say, library computers has the same censorial impact as the removal of books from library shelves. And book banning is precisely the analogy that was invoked by the only court that has ruled on this issue to date. In November 1998, federal judge Leonie Brinkema upheld a First Amendment challenge to mandatory filtering software that had been installed in the Loudoun County, Virginia public libraries. 6 Pursuant to a 'Policy on Internet Sexual
Harassment', the library officials required software to block 'child pornography and obscene material', as well as material deemed 'harmful to juveniles' under state law.5
As an aside-but an important one-I want to note the distorted, overbroad concept of sexual harassment that is reflected in this policy, along with too many others. The policy assumes that the presence of sexually oriented expression on library computer terminals ipso facto constitutes illegal sexual harassment. But that assumption is patently incorrect.
As the US Supreme Court has held, expression does not give rise to a sexual harassment claim merely because a person at whom it is directed considers it offensive."
Even beyond the library's misguided concept of sexual harassment, it also implemented its policy in a way that violated online First Amendment rights, and that was the focus of Judge Brinkema's ruling. Specifically, the library installed a commercial software product called 'X-Stop'. Judge Brinkema held that the filtering requirement operated as a presumptively unconstitutional 'prior restraint' on expression. Therefore, it had to withstand the same type of strict judicial scrutiny that has also been applied to other censorial laws, such as CDA and COPA. 59 Judge Brinkema assumed for the sake of argument that the government's asserted interests were of compelling importance-namely, its interests in minimizing access to obscenity and child pornography, and in avoiding the creation of a sexually hostile environment.
6 0 However, Judge Brinkema concluded that the blocking policy was unconstitutional on several, independently sufficient, grounds: (1) it is not necessary to further the government's asserted interests; (2) it 'is not narrowly tailored'; (3) it limits adult patrons to accessing only material that is fit for minors; (4) it 'provides inadequate standards for restricting access'; and (5) it 'provides inadequate procedural safeguards to ensure prompt judicial review'. 61 One particularly interesting feature of Judge Brinkema's analysis is her catalogue of 'less restrictive means' that Loudoun County could have used to pursue its asserted interests:
installing privacy screens; charging library staff with casual monitoring of Internet use;
installing filtering software only on some Internet terminals, and limiting minors to those N Strossen terminals; and installing filtering software that could be turned off when an adult is using the terminal. 6 2 Significantly, Judge Brinkema cautioned that while all of the foregoing alternatives are less restrictive than the challenged mandatory filtering policy, she did not 'find that any of them would necessarily be constitutional', since that question was not before her. 63 Loudoun County officials decided not to appeal from Judge Brinkema's ruling. 6 4 Of course, the constitutional questions involved will not be settled until the US Supreme Court rules on them in another filtering controversy. 6
Debates about Online Privacy and Cryptography
In the following sections, I would like to amplify a bit on the second major aspect of the cyberliberties/ crime debate that I outlined earlier: the controversy about online privacy and encryption or cryptography. Advocates of restricting encryption argue that, as the price for barring criminals and terrorists from using effective cryptography, we must also bar law-abiding citizens and businesses from doing so. This rationale was effectively debunked in an excellent report that Cyber-Rights and Cyber-Liberties (UK) issued in September 1998 and entitled 'Cyber-crime and Information Terrorism' 6 6 : 'Many things are valuable to criminals and terrorists but this alone does not provide a reason for imposing controls ... .
[C]riminals find cars useful but society doesn't control the supply of cars because of this.'
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In light of this passage, it is ironic to note that when the automobile was first invented, law enforcement officials did seek to restrict its usage, precisely because they did fear that it would facilitate criminal activities. 6' Today that argument seems ludicrous, but, at bottom, it is precisely the same as the one that is now being offered in an attempt to justify restrictions on cryptography. This is the argument that is being made by the Clinton Administration in the US. The Clinton Administration insists that the only kind of encryption technology that should be available is 'key recovery' or 'key escrow' cryptography. Yet this type of encryption is inherently insecure, since it is expressly designed to give covert access to the plaintext of encrypted data to a third party-in particular, the government.
Although some government officials contend that there is a conflict between cyberliberties and cybercrime or cyberterrorism, in fact, that is not so. To the contrary, this situation vividly illustrates Thomas Jefferson's observation I previously quoted: about liberty and security concerns working in tandem, rather than in tension, with each other. Indeed, it is particularly apt to refer to Jefferson's communications with Madison in the cryptography context; when these two American founders corresponded prior to the signing of the Declaration of Independence, they encoded all their messages-in short, they used 18th-century-style encryption! 69 Notwithstanding the Clinton Administration's adamant official position, individual officers and agencies in the US government have broken ranks. One important example is a high-level US government committee: the National Research Council (NRC) committee on cryptography. In its 1996 report, this committee concluded that strong encryption is essential for promoting law enforcement and national security:
If cryptography can protect the trade secrets and proprietary information of businesses and thereby reduce economic espionage (which it can), it also supports in a most important manner the job of law enforcement. If cryptography can help protect nationally critical information systems and networks against unauthorized penetration (which it can), it also supports the national security of the United States.70
Accordingly, even though this NRC report recognized that restricting encryption would strengthen some law enforcement efforts, it nevertheless concluded that '[o]n balance, the advantages of more widespread use of cryptography outweigh the disadvantages'. 1 Some of the reasons for this conclusion were outlined as follows in a September 1998 GILC report that focused specifically on the precise type of cryptography regulation that has been enforced and advocated by the US-export restrictions:
[E]xport controls on cryptography hurt law-abiding companies and citizens without having any significant impact on the ability of criminals, terrorists or belligerent nations to obtain any cryptographic products they wish;
[E]xport restrictions imposed by the major cryptography-exporting states limit the ability of other nations to defend themselves against electronic warfare attacks on vital infrastructure;
[F]ailure to protect the free use and distribution of cryptographic software will jeopardize the life and freedom of human rights activists, journalists and political activists all over the world;
[A]ny restriction on the use of cryptographic programs will be unenforceable in practice, since the basic mathematical and algorithmic methods for strong encryption are widely published and can easily be implemented in software by any person skilled in the art;
[T]he increasingly common use of public networks to electronically distribute such products in intangible form reinforces the unenforceability of export controls. In sum, not only are claims about the dangers of cyberterrorism exaggerated, but also, the proposed counter-measures-notably, restrictions on cryptography-far from being necessary to respond to any such dangers, are not even effective; to the contrary, they are counterproductive. 
